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FOREWORD
The Debris Team has developed and implemented measures to control damage from debris in the
Shuttle operational environment and to make the control measures a part of routine launch flows.
These measures include engineering surveillance during vehicle processing and closeout
operations, facility and flight hardware inspections before and after launch, and photographic
analysis of mission events.
Photographic analyses of mission imagery from launch, on-orbit, and landing provide significant
data in verifying proper operation of systems and evaluating anomalies. In addition to the
Kennedy Space Cemer Photo/Video Analysis, reports from Johnson Space Center and Marshall
Sp.ace Flight Center are also included in this document to provide an integrated assessment of the
mission.
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Photo 1: Launch of Shuttle Mission STS-94
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1.0 SUMMARY
A pre-launch debris inspection of the launch pad and Shuttle vehicle was performed on 30 June
1997. The detailed walkdown of Pad 39A and MLP-1 also included the primary flight elements
OV-102 Columbia (23rd flight), ET-86 (LWT 79), and BI-088 SRB's. There were no significant
vehicle or launch pad anomalies.
The Final Inspection of the cryoloaded vehicle was performed on 1 July 1997 from 0910 to 1100
hours during the two hour built-in-hold at T-3 hours in the countdown. There were no Launch
Commit Criteria (LCC), OMRS, or NSTS-08303 criteria violations. No Ice, Debris, or TPS IPR's
were taken. Due to the warm weather conditions, there were no acreage icing concerns. There
were also no protuberance icing conditions outside of the established data base.
After the 2:02 p.m. (local) launch on 1 July 1997, a debris walk down of Pad 39A was performed.
No flight hardware or TPS materials were found. All the T-0 umbilicals operated properly.
Overall, damage to the launch pad was minimal. The GOX vent seals were evaluated from the
GVA hood access platform; no damage or topcoat residue was noted on the seals.
A total of 111 films and videos were analyzed as part of the post mission data review. No vehicle
damage or lost flight hardware was observed that would have affected the mission.
OV-102 was equipped to carry ET/ORB umbilical cameras. SRB separation from the External
Tank appeared nominal.
Seven very small TPS divots were detected on intertank stringer heads forward of the bipods. No
divots were observed in the LH2 tank-to-intertank flange closeout. A 6-inch by 6-inch area of
foam was missing from the -Y bipod jack pad closeout with some primer showing in the deep part
of the divot.
TPS erosion on LO2 feedline flanges and support brackets, pressurization line ramps, and both
thrust strut flange closeouts was somewhat more than usual, but still acceptable. Likewise, small
and shallow "popcorn" type divots were somewhat greater in quantity on the LH2 tank with most
of the divots, including as many as twenty-two 2-3 inch diameter divots, concentrated forward of
the crossbeam.
Several divots were detected in and around pressurization line and LO2 feedline supports: a
shallow 16-inch long by 10-inch wide divot in the LH2 acreage between the pressurization line
and the LO2 feedline at station XT-1528; a 14-inch long by at least 2-inch wide divot outboard of
the XT-1593 pressurization line ramp; a 5-inch diameter divot (possibly with primer showing)
adjacent to the XT-1623 LO2 feedline inboard support; a 4-inch by 2-inch divot at the leading
edge of the XT-1657 pressurization line ramp; and a shallow, 6-inch by 4-inch divot in the LH2
tank acreage between the pressurization line and the LO2 feedline at station XT-1722.
The Solid Rocket Boosters were inspected at Hanger AF after retrieval. Both frustums were in
excellent condition. No TPS was missing and no debonds were detected over fasteners All four
Booster Separation Motor (BSM) aero heat shield covers on the right frustum were locked in the
fully opened position. The lower right BSM aero heat shield cover on the left frustum was locked
in the fully opened position; the remaining covers were bent. The BSM aero heat shield cover
attach rings had been bent by parachute riser entanglement after splashdown. The forward skins
exhibited no debonds or missing TPS. The Field Joint Protection System (FJPS) closeouts were
generally in good condition. Trailing edge damage to the FJPS and the GEI cork runs were
attributed to debris resulting from severance of the nozzle extension. One area of forward edge
damage was noted on the right hand center joint at about the 200 degree position. This damage
was most probably caused by ice from the ET LO2 feedline forward bellows. Seven of the
holddown post Debris Containment Systems (DCS) plungers were seated and appeared to have
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functionednormally.TheHDP #6DCSplungerwasobstructedbypyro debris.
Orbiterperformanceasviewedon landingfilmsandvideosduringfinal approach,touchdown,and
rollout wasnominal.Dragchuteoperationwasalsonormal.
A post landinginspectionof OV-102 Columbiawas conducted17 July 1997at the Kennedy
SpaceCenteron SLFrunway33.The OrbiterTPSsustaineda total of 90hits, of which 12hada
majordimensionof 1-inchor larger.A comparisonof thesenumbersto statisticsfrom 69previous
missionsof similarconfigurationindicatesboththetotal numberof hits,andthenumberof hits 1-
inch or larger,werelessthanaverage.
TheOrbiter lower surfacesustained a total of 34 hits, of which 11 had a major dimension of 1-
inch or larger. The largest lower surface tile damage site was located on the right chine. The site
measured 3.75 inches long by 1.75-inches wide by 0.125-inches deep.
Hazing and streaking of forward-facing Orbiter windows was typical. Damage sites on the
window perimeter tiles appeared to be less than usual in quantity and size with the exception of a
7.5-inch long by 1.8-inch wide by 0.2-inch deep impact just forward of window #3. This damage
site spanned the 391020-453 white file and two unidentified adjacent black tiles. These damage
sites are believed to be the result of impacts from excessive RTV adhesive used in attaching paper
covers to the FRCS thrusters. In fact, a 2-inch long scorched piece of FRCS thruster paper cover
was wedged between the window #2 glass and perimeter tiles adjacent to three tile damage sites.
2.0 PRE-LAUNCH BRIEFING
The Debris/Ice/TPS and Photographic Analysis Team briefing for launch activities was conducted
on 30 June 1997 at 1400 hours. The following personnel participated in various team activities,
assisted in the collection and evaluation of data, and contributed to reports contained in this
document.
J. Tatum NASA - KSC
G. Katnik NASA - KSC
J. Lin NASA - KSC
R. Speece NASA - KSC
B. Bowen NASA - KSC
J. Rivera NASA - KSC
B. Davis NASA - KSC
R. Page NASA - KSC
M. Valdivia USA- SPC
R. Scale USA- SPC
J. Blue USA- SPC
W. Richards USA- SPC
M. Wollam USA- SPC
G. Fales USA- SPC
F. Foster BNA - LSS
G. J. McClymonds BNA - DNY
R. Harmon THIO - LSS
S. Otto LMSO- LSS
J. Ramirez LMSO - LSS
M. Barber USA- Safety
Chief, ET/SRB Mechanical Systems
Shuttle Ice/Debris Systems
Shuttle Ice/Debris Systems
Thermal Protection Systems
Infrared Scanning Systems
ET Mechanisms/Structures
Digital Imaging Systems
SSP Integration
Supervisor, ET/SRB Mechanical Systems
ET Mechanical Systems
ET Mechanical Systems
ET Mechanical Systems
ET Mechanical Systems
ET Mechanical Systems
Systems Integration
Aerodynamics
SRM Processing
ET Processing
ET Processing
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3.0 LAUNCH
STS-94 was launched at 18:02:00:010 GMT (2:02 p.m. local) on 1 July 1997.
3.1 PRE-LAUNCH SSV/PAD DEBRIS INSPECTION
A pre-launch debris inspection of the launch pad and Shuttle vehicle was performed on 30 June
1997. The detailed walkdown of Pad 39A and MLP-1 also included the primary flight elements
OV-102 Columbia (23rd flight), ET-86 (LWT 79), and BI-088 SRB's. There were no significant
vehicle or launch pad anomalies.
3.2 FINAL INSPECTION
The Final Inspection of the cryoloaded vehicle was performed on 1 July 1997 from 0910 to 1100
hours during the two hour built-in-hold at T-3 hours in the countdown. There were no Launch
Commit Criteria (LCC), OMRS, or NSTS-08303 criteria violations. No Ice, Debris, or TPS IPR's
were taken. Due to the warm weather conditions, there were no acreage icing concerns. There
were also no protuberance icing conditions outside of the established data base.
A portable Shuttle Thermal Imager (STI) infrared scanning radiometer was utilized to obtain
vehicle surface temperature measurements for an overall thermal assessment of the vehicle,
particularly those areas not visible from remote fixed scanners, and to scan for unusual
temperature gradients.
3.2.1 ORBITER
No Orbiter tile or RCC panel anomalies were observed. RCS thruster covers were intact, but the
F4R cover was tinted green indicating small internal vapor leakage. Ice/frost and condensate had
formed on the SSME #2 heat shield-to-nozzle interface. The SSME #1 and #3 heat shields had
condensate only. An infrared scan revealed no unusual temperature gradients on the base heat
shield or engine mounted heat shields.
3.2.2 SOLID ROCKET BOOSTERS
SRB case temperatures measured by the STI radiometers were close to ambient temperatures. All
measured temperatures were above the 34 degrees F minimum requirement. The predicted
Propellant Mean Bulk Temperature supplied by THIO was 80 degrees F, which was within the
required range of 44-86 degrees F.
3.2.3 EXTERNAL TANK
The ice/frost prediction computer program 'SURFICE' was run as a comparison to infrared
scanner point measurements. The program predicted condensate, but no ice or frost, on the ET
acreage TPS.
The Final Inspection Team observed light condensate, but no ice or frost accumulations, on the
LO2 tank acreage. TPS surface temperatures averaged 70 degrees F.
The intertank acreage exhibited no TPS anomalies. Ice/frost accumulation on the GUCP appeared
typical.
The Final Inspection Team observed light condensate, but no ice or frost accumulations, on the
LH2 tank acreage. TPS surface temperatures averaged 68 degrees F. All TPS repairs on the +Z
side of the LH2 tank were intact and in nominal condition.
Less than usual amounts of ice/frost had accumulated in the L02 feedline bellows and support
brackets.
Photo 2:STS-94 Ready for Launch
OV-102 (23 _dflight), ET-86 (LWT79), BI-088 SRB's
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Photo 3:LO2 Tank and Intertank After Cryoload
The Final Inspection Team observed light condensate, but no ice or frost accumulations, on the
LO2 tank acreage. TPS surface temperatures averaged 70 degrees F.
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Photo 4: GUCP
Ice/frost accumulation on the GUCP appeared typical.
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Photo 5: ET LH2 Tank Acreage
The Final Inspection Team observed light condensate, but no ice or frost accumulations,
LH2 tank acreage. TPS surface temperatures averaged 68 degrees F.
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No stress relief crack had formed on the -Y vertical strut forward facing TPS. The presence of a
crack is expected and acceptable for flight per the NSTS-08383 criteria.
There were no TPS anomalies on the LO2 ET/ORB umbilical. Ice/frost accumulations were
limited to small patches on the att and inboard sides. Ice/frost fingers on the separation bolt
pyrotechnic canister purge vents were typical.
Ice and frost in the LH2 recirculation line bellows and on both burst disks was typical. The LH2
feedline bellows were wet with condensate.
Typical amounts of ice/frost had accumulated on the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical purge barrier
outboard side and forward surface. Smaller than usual ice/frost fingers were present on the pyro
canister and plate gap purge vents. No unusual vapors or cryogenic drips had appeared during
tanking, stable replenish, and launch. All TPS repairs on the umbilical were nominal.
3.2.4 FACILITY
All SRB sound suppression water troughs were filled and properly configured for launch.
No leaks were observed on the GUCP or the LO2 and LH2 Orbiter T-0 umbilicals.
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Photo 6: -Y Vertical Strut
No stress relief crack had formed on the -Y vertical strut forward facing TPS. The presence of a
crack is expected and acceptable for flight per the NSTS-083 83 criteria.
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Photo 7:LH2 Feedline and +Z Side Repairs
The LH2 feedline bellows were wet with condensate. All TPS repairs on the +Z side of the LH2
tank were intact and in nominal condition.
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Photo 8: ET/Orbiter LH2 Umbilical
Typical amounts of ice/frost had accumulated on the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical purge barrier
outboard side and forward surface. Smaller than usual ice/frost fingers were present on the pyro
canister and plate gap purge vents.
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4.0 POST LAUNCH PAD DEBRIS INSPECTION
The post launch inspection of MLP 1, Pad A FSS/KSS was conducted on 1 July 1997 from
Launch + 1.5 to 4 hours.
SRB Hold Down Post (HDP) erosion was typical. Boeing-Downey reported a lateral acceleration
of 0.07 g's, which was well below the previously established stud hangup threshold of 0.14 g's.
Af_ skirt purge lines and T-0 umbilicals exhibited typical exhaust plume damage. Pad safety
reported material loss and damage to the firewall in the south flame trench with pieces of ablative
material scattered down the crawlerway to the pad gate.
The Tail Service Masts (TSM) and Orbiter Access Arm (OAA) had no visible damage. The TSM
bonnets were closed.
The GOX vent seals were evaluated from the GVA hood access platform. No damage or ET
topcoat residue was noted on the seals.
The GH2 vent line was latched in the fourth of eight teeth of the latching mechanism. The ET
GUCP had been struck by the retract lanyard, damaging the 7-inch probe at the 11 o'clock
position.
Overall, pad damage was minimal.
14

1Photo 9: Holddown Post # 7 and #8
SRB Hold Down Post (HDP) erosion was typical.
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5.0 FILM REVIEW
Anomalies observed in the Film Review were presented to the Mission Management Team,
Shuttle managers, and vehicle systems engineers. No IPR's or IFA's were generated as a result of
the film review.
5.1 LAUNCH FILM AND VIDEO SUMMARY
A total of 84 films and videos, which included twenty-seven 16ram films, nineteen 35ram films,
and thirty-eight videos, were reviewed starting on launch day.
SSME ignition and Math diamond formation appeared normal (OTV-051, -071).
SSME ignition caused pieces of ice to fall from the ET/ORB umbilicals. Several pieces of ice
were pulled toward the LH_2 umbilical cavity sill, but did not appear to contact the vehicle. No tile
damage was visible (OTV-009).
A dark colored object was visible on the -Z side of the LO2 TSM at 18:01:55.872 UTC. The
object first appeared outboard of the right hand SRB and fell toward the base of the TSM. The
object did not impact the vehicle. (E-17, OTV-63)
Tile surface coating material was lost during ignition from one place outboard of SSME #3 and
one place on the aft surface of the LH RCS stinger (E-18, -20).
The LO2 TSM door rebounded substantially aiter initial closure (E-3, -20
No hold down post (I-if)P) stud hangups occurred. Hold down post shoe rock was visible on
HDP's 2, 3, 5, and 6. No ordnance debris or frangible nut pieces fell from the DCS/stud holes. (E-
8, -10, -12, -13)
GUCP disconnect from the ET and GH2 vent line retraction was nominal. Residual GH2 vapors
were present in the flight QD. (E-33, OTV-4, -63).
Several debris-induced streaks occurred in the SSME exhaust plume during ascent (E-212, -217, -
222, -223).
Typical body flap movement (amplitude and frequency) was visible (E-207, -212, -222).
Several particles, most likely pieces of Instafoam from the SRB aft skirt rings, fell along side the
SRB exhaust plume during ascent (E-224).
SRB exhaust plume recirculation appeared typical (E-207).
SRB separation appeared normal (E-207, -208, -212).
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Photo 10: Debris Visible on -Z side ofLO2 TSM
A dark colored object was visible on the -Z side of the LO2 TSM at 18:01:55.872 UTC The
object first appeared outboard of the fight hand SRB and fell toward the base of the TSM. The
object appeared to be close to the camera lens. The object did not impact the vehicle.
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5.2 ON-ORBIT FILM AND VIDEO SUMMARY
OV-102 was equipped to carry umbilical cameras: 16ram motion picture with 5 mm lens; 16ram
motion picture with 10mm lens; 35ram still views. The +X translation was performed on this
flight. Handheld photography by the flight crew consisted of thirty-seven still 35mm images.
SRB separation from the External Tank appeared nominal. Very thin, charred layers of TPS were
observed falling away from the ai_ surface of the -Y upper strut fairing closeout and aft surface of
the vertical strut just before SRB separation. This is a normal occurrence.
ET-86 separation from the Orbiter also appeared normal. The nose cone appeared to be in
nominal condition. A bright spot, either at the leading edge of the XT-593 pressurization line
ramp, or in the acreage between ramps, may be a small, shallow divot that could not be confirmed
with the available photography.
Seven very small TPS divots were detected on intertank stringer heads forward of the bipods. No
divots were observed in the LH2 tank-to-intertank flange closeout. A 6-inch by 6-inch area of
foam was missing from the -Y bipod jack pad closeout with some primer showing in the deep part
of the divot.
TPS erosion on LO2 feedline flanges and support brackets, pressurization line ramps, and both
thrust strut flange closeouts was somewhat more than usual, but still acceptable. Likewise, small
and shallow "popcorn" type divots were somewhat greater in quantity on the LH2 tank with most
of the divots, including as many as twenty-two 2-3 inch diameter divots, concentrated forward of
the crossbeam.
Several divots were detected in and around pressurization line and LO2 feedline supports: a
shallow 16-inch long by 10-inch wide divot in the LH2 acreage between the pressurization line
and the LO2 feedline at station XT-1528; a 14-inch long by at least 2-inch wide divot outboard of
the XT-1593 pressurization line ramp; a 5-inch diameter divot (possibly with primer showing)
adjacent to the XT-1623 LO2 feedline inboard support; a 4-inch by 2-inch divot at the leading
edge of the XT-1657 pressurization line ramp; and a shallow, 6-inch by 4-inch divot in the LH2
tank acreage between the pressurization line and the LO2 feedline at station XT-1722.
The ET/SRB upper strut fairing splice plate closeouts were intact but exhibited shallow "new
foam" colored areas as thin layers of charred TPS flaked off during ascent.
The LH2 ET/ORB umbilical appeared to be in good condition after separation with no TPS
damage. Frozen hydrogen adhered to the 17-inch disconnect and parts of the separation interface.
Typically, foam had eroded from the horizontal (clamshell) section of the cable tray and the LH2
feedline support arm.
The LO2 ET/ORB umbilical sustained no visible TPS damage during separation. Numerous
divots and eroded areas were visible on the horizontal and vertical sections of the cable tray. The
red barrier around the EO-3 fitting was dislodged.
Aft dome NCFI 24-57 exhibited somewhat more than usual charring and "popcorn" divoting than
previous flights.
No significant loss of foam from the upper LH2 tank/LO2 feedline area was observed that could
be related to the cause of the debris impact to the RH SRB cork run. Since damage to the Orbiter
lower surface tiles was less than average, no IFA's on ET TPS divots will be proposed.
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Photo 11 : SRB/ET Separation
SRB separation from the External Tank appeared nominal.
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Photo 12 : ET Intertank TPS Divots
(I) Seven very small TPS divots were detected on intertank stringer heads forward of the bipods.
(2) A 6-inch by 6-inch area of foam was missing from the -Y bipod jack pad closeout with some
primer showing in the deep part of the divot.
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Photo 13 : ET LH2 Tank TPS Divots
Several divots were detected in and around pressurization line and LO2 feedline supports: (l) a
shallow 16-inch long by 10-inch wide divot in the LH2 acreage between the pressurization line
and the LO2 feedline at station XT-1528; (2) a 14-inch long by at least 2-inch wide divot
outboard of the XT-1593 pressurization line ramp; (3) a 5-inch diameter divot (possibly with
primer showing) adjacent to the XT-1623 LO2 feedline inboard support; (4) a 4-inch by 2-inch
divot at the leading edge of the XT-1657 pressurization line ramp; (5) and a shallow, 6-inch by 4-
inch divot in the LH2 tank acreage between the pressurization line and the LO2 feedline at station
XT- 1722.
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Photo 14 : ET/ORB LO2 Umbilical
The LO2 ET/ORB umbilical sustained no visible TPS damage during separation. Numerous
divots and eroded areas were visible on the horizontal and vertical sections of the cable tray. The
red barrier around the EO-3 fitting was dislodged.
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5.3 LANDING FILM AND VIDEO SUMMARY
A total of 23 films and videos, which included nine 35ram large format films, two 16mm films,
and twelve videos, were reviewed.
The landing gear extended properly. The infrared scanners showed no debris falling from the
Orbiter during final approach. The left main landing gear contacted the runway first just west of
the runway centerline.
Drag chute deployment appeared nominal.
Touchdown of the nose landing gear was smooth. Rollout and wheel stop were uneventful.
No significant TPS damage was visible in the films.
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6.0 SRB POST FLIGHT/RETRIEVAL DEBRIS ASSESSMENT
The BI-088 Solid Rocket Boosters were inspected for debris damage and debris sources at CCAS
Hangar AF on 3-7 July 1997
Both frustums were in excellem condition. No TPS was missing and no debonds were detected
over fasteners on either frustum. None of the Hypalon paint had blistered. All four BSM aero heat
shield covers on the right frustum were locked in the fully opened position. The lower right BSM
aero heat shield cover on the left frustum was locked in the fully opened position; the remaining
covers were bent. The BSM aero heat shield cover attach tings had been bent by parachute riser
entanglement after splashdown.
The forward skirts exhibited no debonds or missing TPS. The RSS antennae covers/phenolic base
plates were intact. The +Z antenna base plate on both SRB's exhibited one delaminated phenolic
layer. Hypalon paint was blistered/missing over the areas where BTA closeouts had been applied.
No pins were missing and no pin retainer clips were bent on either frustum severance ring.
The Field Joint Protection System (FJ'PS) closeouts were generally in good condition. Trailing
edge damage to the FJPS and the GEI cork runs were attributed to debris resulting from
severance of the nozzle extension. One area of forward edge cork damage was noted on the ri.ght
hand center joint at about the 200 degree position. This damage was most probably caused by lee
from the ET LO2 feedline forward bellows.
Separation of the aft ET/SKB struts appeared normal. The ETA ring, IEA, and IEA covers
appeared undamaged from splashdown
The forward stiffner ring on the left booster had been damaged by splashdown. The stiffener ring
had separated from the a_ff booster from approximately 200 to 290 degrees.
TPS on the external surface of both aft skirts was intact and in good condition. Internally, less
than usual amounts of foam were missing on the aft skirt a.ff tings.
Seven of the holddown post Debris Containment Systems (DCS) plungers were seated and
appeared to have functioned normally. The HDP #6 DCS plunger was obstructed by pyro debris.
24
\\
Photo 15: Right Frustum
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Photo 16: Left Frustum
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Photo 17: Left Forward Skirt
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fphoto lg: l_ight Forward sRirt
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Photo 19: Right Center Joint FJPS Damage
Damage was found on the right hand SRB center joint leading edge at about the 200 degree
position. This damage was most probably caused by ice from the ET LO2 feedline forward
bellows.
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Photo 20: LH SRB Stiffener Ring Damage
The lefthand SRB forward stiffener ring had separated from the aft booster from approximately
200 to 290 degrees. Damage was most likely caused by splashdown.
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Photo 21: Lefthand SRB/ET Struts
31

\Photo 22: Righthand SRB/ET Struts
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7.0 ORBITER POST LANDING DEBRIS ASSESSMENT
A post landing inspection of OV-102 Columbia was conducted 17-18 July 1997 at the Kennedy
Space Center on SLF runway 33 and in the Orbiter Processing Facility bay #2. This inspection
was performed to identify debris impact damage and, if possible, debris sources. The Orbiter TPS
sustained a total of 90 hits, of which 12 had a major dimension of 1-inch or larger. This total does
not include the numerous hits on the base heat shield attributed to SSME vibration/acoustics and
exhaust plume recirculation. A comparison of these numbers to statistics from 69 previous
missions of similar configuration (excluding missions STS-23, 24, 25, 26, 26R, 27R, 30R, and 42,
which had damage from known debris sources), indicates both the total number of hits, and the
number of hits 1-inch or larger, were less than average (Reference attached Figure 3. Note: no
debris hits were recorded on both left and fight sides of the Orbiter. Accordingly, those two
figures have been omitted).
The following table breaks down the STS-94 Orbiter debris damage by area:
HITS > 1" TOTAL HITS
Lower surface 11 34
Upper surface 1 50
Right side 0 0
Left side 0 0
Right OMS Pod 0 3
Left OMS Pod 0 3
TOTALS 12 90
The Orbiter lower surface sustained a total of 34 hits, of which 11 had a major dimension of
1-inch or larger. The largest lower surface tile damage site was located on the right chine and
measured 3.75-inches long by 1.75-inches wide by 0.125-inch deep. The shallow damage site
most likely was caused by an impact from a low density object, such as ET foam.
Tile damage sites around the LH2 and LO2 ET/ORB umbilicals were less than usual in number
and size.
Two tile damage sites forward of the fight MLG wheel well (tiles 191003-041 and 191003-177)
were originally thought to be candidates for micrometeorite impacts due to the 0.75-inch diameter
surface openings with larger, deep internal cavities. However, closer inspection in the OPF
revealed glazing and erosion, which suggested the impacts occurred during ascent.
No other tile damage from micrometeorites or on-orbit debris was identified during this inspection
with the exception of the on-orbit impact to overhead window #7. The impact crater was
approximately 0.25-inch in diameter.
The tires were reported to be in average condition for a landing on the KSC concrete runway.
Some ply undercutting occurred on the MLG left inboard and right outboard tires.
ET/Orbiter separation devices EO-1, EO-2, and EO-3 functioned normally. No ordnance
fragments were found on the runway beneath the umbilical cavities. Virtually no umbilical
closeout foam or white RTV dam material adhered to the umbilical plate near the LH2
recirculation line disconnect. The EO-2 and EO-3 retainer springs were dislodged. This condition
has been observed on previous flights. One clip from the EO-2 and two clips from the EO-3 salad
bowls were missing. A black deposit adhered to the inside of the LO2 ET door.
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Damage to base heat shield tiles appeared to be less than usual. The SSME Dome Mounted Heat
Shield (DMHS) closeout blankets were in excellent condition, though some fraying was noted on
the SSME #2 blanket at the 3-4:00 position.
Tiles on the vertical stabilizer "stinger" were intact and undamaged.
No ice adhered to the payload bay door. No unusual tile damage was observed on the leading
edge of the vertical stabilizer. Although no significant tile damage was visible on the OMS pods, a
2-inch long by 1-inch wide piece of burned cloth tape was detected on the left OMS pod. Nearby,
a 5-inch diameter RTV repair area had outgassed and charred, but was not the subject of a debris
hit.
Hazing and streaking of forward-facing Orbiter windows was typical. Damage sites on the
window perimeter tiles appeared to be less than usual in quantity and size with the exception of a
7.5-inch long by 1.8-inch wide by 0.2-inch deep impact just forward of window #3. This damage
site spanned the 391020-453 white tile and two unidentified adjacent black tiles. These damage
sites are believed to be the result of impacts from excessive RTV adhesive used in attaching paper
covers to the FRCS thrusters. A 2-inch long scorched piece of FRCS thruster paper cover was
wedged between the window #2 glass and perimeter tiles adjacent to three tile damage sites.
The post landing walkdown of Runway 33 was performed immediately after landing. Three Ames
tile gap fillers were found on the runway generally below the right inboard devon at the Orbiter
wheel-stop point. However, the thin gap fillers most likely originated from some place near the
nose or nose landing gear doors. All drag chute hardware was recovered and appeared to have
functioned normally. However, impact with the runway caused one of the TPS-covered cartier
panels to be ripped offthe drag chute door.
In summary, both the total number of Orbiter TPS debris hits, and the number of hits 1-inch or
larger, were less than average when compared to previous missions.
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Figure 1: Orbiter Lower Surface Debris Damage Map
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Figure 2: Orbiter Upper Surface Debris Damage Map
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Figure 3: Orbiter Post Flight Debris Damage Summary
37

_i_ i¸_i:_i _il¸
Photo 23: Overall View Orbiter Left Side
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Photo 24: Overall View Orbiter Right Side
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Photo 25: Overall View of Orbiter Nose
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Photo 26: Overall View of Orbiter Base Heat Shield
41

Photo 27: Tile Damage Sites Forward of Right MLG Door
Two tile damage sites forward of the right MLG wheel well (tiles 191003-041 and 191003-177)
were originally thought to be candidates for micrometeorite impacts due to the _A-inch diameter
surface openings with larger, deep internal cavities. However, closer inspection in the OPF
revealed glazing and erosion, which suggested the impacts occurred during ascent.
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Photo 28:LO2 ET/ORB Umbilical
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Photo 29:LH2 ET/ORB Umbilical
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Photo 30: Ames Tile Gap Fillers Found on Runway
Three Ames tile gap fillers were found on the runway generally below the fight inboard elevon at
the Orbiter wheel-stop point. However, the thin gap fillers most likely originated from some place
near the nose or nose landing gear doors.
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Photo 31: Windows 1- 3
A 7.5-inch long by 1.8-inch wide by 0.2-inch deep impact was found forward of Window #3. This
damage site spanned the 391020-453 white tile and two unidentified adjacent black tiles. These
damage sites are believed to be the result of impacts from excessive RTV adhesive used in
attaching paper covers to the FRCS thrusters. In fact, a 2-inch long scorched piece of FRCS
thruster paper cover was wedged between the window #2 glass and perimeter tiles adjacent to
three tile damage sites.
Photo 32: Windows 4 - 6
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STS-94 (OV-102): FILM/VIDEO SCREENING AND TIMING SUMMARY
SCREENING ACTIVITIES
1.1.1 Launch
The STS-94 afternoon launch of Columbia (OV-102) from pad A occurred on
Tuesday, July 1, 1997 (day 182)at 18:02:00.003 Coordinated Universal Time
(UTC), as seen on camera El0. Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) separation occurred
at 18:04:03.467 UTC, as seen on camera E212.
On launch day, 24 of the 24 expected videos were received and screened.
Following launch day, twenty films were screened. Twenty-three additional films
were received for contingency support and anomaly resolution, but were not
screened since there were no major launch/ascent issues.
Detailed Test Objective 312 was performed using umbilical well film (Method 1)
and handheld still photography (Method 4). The DTO-312 ET separation
photography was analyzed for indications of the possible debris source that
caused the damage to the right SRB on the forward edge of the right-hand center
field joint protection system. Although several items of interest on the ET TPS
were noted, none are believed to attribute to the RSRB damage.
1.1.2 On-Orbit
On mission day three, six Electronic Still Camera (ESC) pictures were down-
linked by the STS-94 crew of a damage area on the outer pane of an Orbiter
overhead window (Window #7). This damage probably resulted from a micro-
meteoroid or orbital debris impact. Figure 1.1.2 is a view of the impact area from
down-linked ESC picture number $94E5028. The impact area is enhanced and
enlarged (inset) to show the extent of damage. No on-orbit analysis support was
requested.
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Figure 1.1.2 Debris Impact on Overhead Window #7
1.1.3 Landing
Columbia landed on runway 33 at the KSC Shuttle Landing Facility early on the
morning of July 17, 1997. Twelve videos were received and screened. Following
landing, eleven films were screened.
Contrails were seen trailing from the Orbiter wing tips prior to landing (Cameras
EL1, EL2, EL4, EL7, EL9, EL10, EL12, KTV5L, KTV6L, KTV12L, KTVI5L,
KTV33L, SLF-North, SLF-South).
Although not considered anomalous, APU venting was seen during the approach
through landing, roll-out and wheel stop. Flames were seen coming from the
APU vent after wheel stop until APU shutdown.
The drag chute deployment appeared normal.
1.1.4 Post Landing
The following items were seen on the post landing walk-around video: a dark-
colored blemish or divot on the leading edge of the left OMS pod, typical
erosion/chipping of the surface area of the base heat shield tiles between
the SSMEs, minor single-tile damage on the base of the left RCS stinger, slight
tile damage on the upper left surface of the body flap, tile damage on the lower
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perimeter tiles between Orbiter forward windows number two and number three,
and several small cut marks on the right main gear outboard tire.
TIMING ACTIVITIES
The time codes from videos and films were used to identify specific events
during the initial screening process.
The landing and drag chute event times are provided in Table 1.2.
Event Description Time (UTC) Camera
Landing Gear - Doors Opened
Left Main Wheel Touchdown
Right Main Wheel Touchdown
Drag Chute Initiation
Pilot Chute at Full Inflation
Bag Release
Drag Chute Inflation in Reefed
Configuration
Drag Chute Inflation in
Disreefed Configuration
Nose Wheel Touchdown
Drag Chute Release
Wheel Stop
198:10:46:12.830 KTV 12L
198:10:46:33.183 EL9
198:10:46:33.468 EL15
198:10:46:36.710 EL9
198:10:46:37.503 EL9
198:10:46:38.186 KTV33L
198:10:46:39.178 EL2
198:10:46:42.480 ELA
198:10:46:44.210
198:10:47:11.836
198:10:47:28.327
EL12
KTV15L
EL10
Table 1.2 Landing Events Timing
SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS
DEBRIS FROM SSME IGNITION TO LIFTOFF
As on previous missions, multiple pieces of debris were seen near the time of
SSME ignition to liftoff. The debris included umbilical ice, RCS paper and SRB
flame duct debris. No damage to the vehicle was noted. No follow-up action
was requested.
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Figure 2.1 (A) Light-colored Debris near RSRB Stinger during SSME Ignition
A single piece of light-colored debris, possibly RCS paper or ice debris, was seen
coming from behind the RSRB stinger during SSME ignition
( 18:01:56.821 UTC) (Cameras OTV070, 0TV051).
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Figure 2.1 (B) Ice Debris Strike to LH2 Umbilical Well Door Sill
Multiple pieces of ice debris from the LH2 ET/Orbiter umbilical were seen
falling during SSME ignition. A piece of ice debris was seen to strike the LH2
umbilical well door sill (18:01:56.920 UTC)( Camera OTV009).
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Figure 2.1 (C) Ice Debris Contacts Orbiter Tiles
A single piece of ET/Orbiter umbilical ice debris appeared to contact the Orbiter
tiles aft of the ET/Orbiter LH2 umbilical during SSME ignition
( 18:01:57.688 UTC) (Camera OTV063).
Two dark-colored pieces of debris (possibly birds) were seen traveling across the
camera field-of-view between the LO2 TSM and the RSRB at liftoff
(18:02:00.57 UTC) (Camera E2).
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Figure 2.1 (D) Debris Forward of ET/Orbiter Umbilicals
During liftoff, a single light-colored piece of debris was seen falling from an
unidentified area forward of the ET/Orbiter umbilicals (18:02:00.657 UTC)
(Camera OTV009). Also, during liftoff, multiple pieces of ET/Orbiter umbilical
ice were seen falling along the body flap (Camera E4). The debris did not appear
to contact the vehicle.
A rectangular-shaped piece of debris (probably a paper tag) fell from the LO2
TSM T-O umbilical into the SSME #3 exhaust plume during liftoff
(18:02:01.2 UTC) (Camera El7).
Multiple pieces of SRB flame duct debris were seen at liftoff. None of the debris
were seen to contact the Shuttle Launch Vehicle.
2.2 DEBRIS DURING ASCENT
During ascent, multiple pieces of debris (probably umbilical ice and RCS paper)
fell aft of the launch vehicle after liftoff, through the roll maneuver, and beyond.
No damage to the vehicle was noted. No follow-up action was requested.
(Cameras E31, E34, E222, E223, E224).
Two large, light-colored objects (probably birds close to the camera) were seen
near the SRB aft skirts during early ascent (18:02:06.313 and 18:02:07.821 UTC)
(Camera E222).
Several light-colored pieces of debris were seen near the SRB exhaust plume
during ascent (18:02:17.633 and 18:02:20.878 UTC) (Camera E224).
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A small light-colored piece of debris (probably forward RCS paper) was seen
near the right wing tip at 18:02:30.750 UTC (Camera E222).
MOBILE LAUNCH PLATFORM (MLP) EVENTS
The SSME Mach diamond formation appeared to occur normally as seen on
Camera El9. No follow-up action was requested. The times of the Mach
diamond lbrmation are provided in Table 2.3.
SSME #3 18:01:56.695 UTC
SSME #2 18:01:56.893 UTC
SSME #1 18:01:56.957 UTC
Table 2.3 Mach Diamond Formation
Orange vapor, probably free burning hydrogen, was seen above the SSME rims
and near the base of the vertical stabilizer during SSME ignition
(18:01:54.8 UTC) (Cameras OTV070, E2, E5, El7, El9, E20).
Orange vapors have been seen on previous missions.
2.4 ASCENT EVENTS
Figure 2.4 (A) Unusual Vapor-like Puff along Exhaust Plume
A white vapor-like puff (probably a cloud) appeared to extend laterally away from
the SRB exhaust plume during ascent (18:02:17.1 UTC) (Camera OTV048).
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Figure 2.4 (B) Orange-colored Flare in SSME Exhaust Plume
Approximately five orange-colored flares (probably debris induced) were seen in
the SSME exhaust plume during ascent between 18:02:27.984 and 18:02:36.31
UTC (Cameras E222, E224, KTV4A, KTV21A, ET213).
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Figure 2.4 (C) Condensation Around the Launch Vehicle
Atmospheric condensation appeared to form a collar around the launch vehicle
between 18:02:35.2 and 18:02:50 UTC (Cameras E207, E212, E222, E223, E224,
ET207, ET208, ET212, KTV2, KTV13).
An orange-colored flash was seen near the Orbiter right wing tip at
18:02:45.802 UTC. The flash was not seen on the other long range tracking views
screened. This flash occurred at the same time condensation was visible around
the launch vehicle and was probably a reflection of the SRB exhaust plume on an
area of visible moisture.
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Figure 2.4 (D) Recirculation
Recirculation, or the expansion of burning gasses at the aft end of the vehicle,
was seen during ascent (18:02:32.4 through 18:03:44.9 UTC) (Cameras E212,
KTV 13, ET208, ET212, KTV21A).
Linear optical effects were seen along the launch vehicle between 18:02:56.054
and 18:03:02.367 UTC (Cameras E212, ET212).
2.5 ONBOARD PHOTOGRAPHY OF THE EXTERNAL TANK (DTO-312)
2.5.1 Analysis of the Umbilical Well Camera Films (Task #2)
Three rolls of STS-94 umbilical well camera film were acquired (DTO-312,
Method 1): the 35mm film from the LO2 umbilical, the 16mm film (5mm lens)
and the 16mm film (10mm lens) from the LH2 umbilical. The +X translation
maneuver was performed on STS-94. While the following items are of interest,
nothing was seen that is considered anomalous or is related to the post-flight
damage found on the right SRB.
Numerous light-colored pieces of debris (insulation and frozen hydrogen), and
dark debris (probably charred insulation), were seen throughout the SRB
separation sequence. Typical ablation and charring of the ET/Orbiter LH2
umbilical electric cable tray and the aft surface of the horizontal section of the -Y
ET/SRB vertical strut was seen. Ablation and charring of the TPS on the aft
dome was normal. The LSRB separation appeared normal. Several small, dark
discolorations were seen on the LSRB segment case aft of the LSRB/ET attach
point.
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Typical frozen hydrogen debris was seen throughout the ET separation sequence.
Although difficult to see due to backlighting, the LH2 carrier plate appeared
normal. A large piece of frozen hydrogen was visible on the LH2 17-inch line
orifice. Two white areas (probably frozen hydrogen) were visible to the right of
the LH2 umbilical near the cross beam. A divot was visible by the ET/Orbiter
attach -Y bipod jackpad close-out.
Figure 2.5.1 (A) ET/Orbiter LO2 Umbilical
One of the five lightning contact strips (12 o'clock position) appeared to be
missing from the ET/Orbiter LO2 umbilical interface plate (1). KSC reported
that STS-94 (ET-86) was the first vehicle to use the new "wire-mesh" electrical
contact plates (lightning contact strips) on the LO2 ET/Orbiter umbilical. This
new material is similar in form to umbilical foam and can give the appearance
that a contact plate is missing. KSC confirmed that all five of the LO2 umbilcal
contact plates were intact and properly attached.
TPS erosion/divots were visible on the vertical section of the LO2 electric cable
tray (2).
The red-colored thermal barrier on the EO-3 fitting was partially detached (3).
Chipping of the TPS on the aft LO2 feedline flange was visible (4). Chipping of
the TPS on the aft portion of the +Z side of the LH2 tank and TPS erosion on the
LH2 tank in the -Y direction of the LO2 feedline were visible.
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Figure 2.5.1 (B) LH2 Tank Divots
A shallow white mark (divot) approximately four inches in diameter was seen to
the left of the LO2 feedline on the LH2 tank TPS at approximately station
XT-1623 (1). Several divots were seen near the LH2 tank pressurization line and
the LO2 feedline support brackets: a white mark (divot), approximately six
inches in size, is visible between the LO2 feedline and the electric cable tray
forward of the +Y thrust strut at approximate station XT 1722 (2), a 14-inch long
divot was noted outboard (+Y) of the electric cable tray ramp at approximate
station 1593 (3), and a 16-inch long divot was visible between the LO2 feedline
and the pressurization line at approximate station XT 1528 (4).
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Figure 2.5.1 (C) -Y Jackpad Close-out Divot
An approximately four-inch diameter divot with primer visible was seen by the
ET/Orbiter attach -Y bipod jackpad close-out. Several small (one-inch diameter)
intertank stringer-head divots were visible forward of the right leg of the
ET/Orbiter attach bipod.
Figure 2.5.1 (D) White Mark (Possible Divot) on ET Nose
A small, white mark (divot) was seen on the ET nose to the left of the electric
cable tray. The PAL ramp and the LO2 feedline fairing appeared normal.
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2.5.2 Analysis of Handheld Photography of the ET (Task #3)
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Figure 2.5.2 (A) Handheld Photograph of ET
DTO-312 handheld photography (Method 4) of the STS-94 ET was acquired
after ET separation. A Nikon 35mm camera with a 400mm lens and a 2X
extender was used. The OMS-2 attitude pitch maneuver was performed early to
assist the crew members in acquiring the ET visually.
Thirty-seven views of the external tank were acquired (roll 444). The first three
views are of the ET -Z/+Y axis. The next five views are of the ET +Z/+Y axis
and the aft dome. The remaining twenty-one views are of the ET +Z/-Y axis.
The first picture was taken on July 1, 1997 at 18:20:04 UTC (approximately 18
minutes after liftoff). The last picture was at 18:22:33 UTC.
While the following items are of interest, nothing was seen that is considered
anomalous or that is related to the post-flight damage found on the right SRB.
STS-94 (ET-86) was the first flight of the new NCFI 24-124 TPS on the liquid
oxygen tank barrel and ogive. STS-94 was the second flight of the new liquid
hydrogen tank (LH2) sidewall thermal protection system (NCFI 24-184) first
flown on STS-84 (ET-85). The new liquid hydrogen tank and oxygen tank barrel
thermal protection system (TPS) appeared to be in good condition on the
handheld photography.
The new LH2 tank aft dome TPS (NCFI 24-57), first flown on STS-79 (ET-82),
appeared to be in good condition. The new intertank access door, also first flown
on STS-79, was not photographed.
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The following events, although not anomalous, were noted on the hand-held
photography of the ET:
1) A long linear-shaped yellow-colored mark seen extending across the LO2
tank/intertank close-out flange on the far side of the tank (+Y/-Z axis) is
believed to be an optical effect caused by an image smear of the RSS
antenna.
2) Two possible divots, or perhaps close-out marks, were visible in the mid-
section of the LH2 tank TPS (+Y/+Z axis). A faint, linear-shaped, thin aero-
heating mark extended along the length of the LH2 tank TPS. Aero-heating
marks are typically seen on the hand-held photography.
3) A light-colored mark, confirmed to be a divot on the umbilical well
photography, was visible near the left leg of the ET/Orbiter attach bipod
close-out TPS.
4) A light-colored mark, possibly a divot, was visible on the LH2 tank-to-
intertank close-out flange (-Y/+Z axis).
The normal SRB separation motor burn scars were visible on the ET TPS.
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STS-94 ET/Orbiter Separation
(6.6 m/s)
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Figure 2.5.2 (B) ET Separation Velocity
The distance of the external tank was calculated on twenty frames. On the first
usable view, the external tank was calculated to be at a distance of 2.6
kilometers away from the Orbiter at 18:04 MET. On the last view, 2 minutes and
23 seconds after the first view, the tank was calculated to be at a distance of 3.5
kilometers (18:06:23 MET). The tank separation average velocity was
determined to be 6.6 meters/second (m/s), with an uncertainty of approximately
1 m/s. The tank tumble rate was approximately 1.8 degrees/second. The tank
roll rate was 0.3 degrees/second.
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2.6 LANDING EVENTS
2.6.1 Landing Sink Rate Analysis (Task #1)
Film camera EL9 was used to determine the landing sink rate of the Orbiter main
gear and EL12 was used to determine the nose gear sink rate. The sink rates of
the Orbiter were determined over a one second time period prior to main and
nose gear touchdown.
The measured main gear sink rate values were found to be below the maximum
allowable values of 9.6 ft/sec for a 211,000 lb. vehicle and 6.0 ft/sec for a
240,000 lb. vehicle. The landing weight of the STS-94 Orbiter was reported to
be 230,911 lb. The sink rate measurements for STS-94 are given in Table 2.6.1.
In Figure 2.6.1 (A), and 2.6. I(B), the trends of the measured data points for the
image data are illustrated.
Sink Rate Prior to Touchdown (1 Second)
Main Gear 1.5 ft/sec.
Nose Gear 4.0 ft/sec.
Table 2.6.1 Sink Rate Measurements
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STS-94 Main Gear Landing Sink Rate
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Figure 2.6.1 (A) Main Gear Height versus Time Prior to Touchdown
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Figure 2.6.1 (B) Nose Gear Height versus Time Prior to Touchdown
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2.7 OTHER
2.7.1 Normal Events
Other normal events observed included: ice and vapor from the ET/Orbiter
umbilical areas during SSME ignition, elevon motion at SSME ignition, ET
twang, multiple pieces of light-colored debris falling from the LH2 and LO2
TSM T-0 umbilicals prior to and following disconnect, MLP debris at liftoff,
acoustic waves during liftoff, birds in view during liftoff, debris in the exhaust
cloud after liftoff, vapor off the SRB stiffener rings, condensation from the
Orbiter wing tips, roll maneuver, slight body flap motion during ascent, ET aft
dome charring, expansion waves, linear optical effect, SRB plume brightening,
SRB separation, and slag debris after SRB separation.
2.7.2 Normal Pad Events
Normal Pad events observed were: hydrogen ignitor operation, FSS deluge
water operation, MLP deluge water activation, GH2 vent arm retraction,
LH2 and LO2 TSM door closures, and sound suppression system water
operation.
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APPENDIX B. MSFC PHOTOGRAPHIC ANALYSIS SUMMARY
B

National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
George C. Marshall Space Flight Center
Marshall Space Flight Center, AL 35812
leply to Attn of:
EP42 (97-049) AUG _:3 19_7
TO:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
Distribution
EP42/Thomas J. Rieckhoff
Engineering Photographic Analysis Report for STS-94
The launch of space shuttle mission STS-94, the twenty-third flight of the Orbiter Columbia
occurred on July 1, 1997, at approximately 1:02 P.M. Central Daylight Time from Launch
Complex 39A (LC-39A), Kennedy Space Center (KSC), Florida. Launch time was reported as
97:182:18:01:59.993 Universal Coordinated Time CUCT) by the MSFC Flight Evaluation Team.
Photographic and video coverage were evaluated to determine proper operation of the flight
hardware.
All ground based films and videos have been received and reviewed at MSFC. Film and video
coverage of the launch of STS-94 is considered excellent. Camera El9 vibrated during SSME
start and li_Roff causing image motion and camera E 11 images were slurred. The rainy weather
and the high humidity impacted the performance of other film cameras. Condensation formed on
the lens of cameras E52 and E54 greatly reducing resolution. Cameras E202 and E220
experienced erratic tracking of the vehicle due to the weather. Clouds temporarily obscured the
view from several tracking cameras.
The astronauts recorded thirty-seven images of the ET after separation using the hand-held
camera. All sides of-the ET were imaged. The umbilical well cameras recorded the SRB
separation, but were strongly back lighted by the sun during ET separation which resulted in
reduced data. However, the 35mm sequencing camera provided useful data.
No anomalies or problems were identified from the film and video review. All MSFC elements
appeared to operate normally. The typical events of ice/frost falling from the 17-inch
disconnects during SSME start and liffoff, debris induced streaks in the SSME plumes and
glowing debris particles being ejected from the SRM plumes after SRB separation were
observed. A condensation collar formed around the vehicle during ascent.
The typical "popcorning" was observed on the lower portion of the ET LH2 tank and the aft
dome. A few shallow divots in the acreage TPS were noted along the LO2 feedline and pressline
ramps. One TPS divot was noted underneath the forward bipod strut.
_t
The following event times were acquired:
EVENT
M-1 PIC Firing
M-2 PIC Firing
M-5 PIC Firing
M-6 PIC Firing
SRB separation
TIME (UTC)
18:02:00.001
18:02:00.001
18:02-00.000
18:02:00.001
18:04:03.44
DATA SOURCE
Camera E9
Camera E8
Camera E 12
Camera E 13
Camera E207
This report and additional information are available on the World Wide Web at URL:
http://photo4.msfc.nasa.gov/STS/sts94/sts94.html.
For further information concerning this report contact Tom Rieckhoffat 205-544-7677 or Jeff
ITlxson, __ at
Boeing North 205-971-3082.
Thomas .l. Rieckhoff
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